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1. Introduction
Suﬃcientarian approaches to distributive justice aim to ensure that everyone has 
“enough” of morally relevant goods or services.1 One aspect of determining what 
constitutes “enough” in the health care arena involves deciding which interven-
tions comprise a decent minimum basket of preventative, curative, or rehabilita-
tive health care benefits— that is, a basket that enables the realization of normative 
conceptions of suﬃciency that may be based on notions of a minimally decent 
life, a life of dignity, or a life of genuine political equality in a democracy.2 In 
practice, some countries have more comprehensive benefit packages than others.3 
Theoretical accounts can provide an independent “moral yardstick” that helps de-
termine the extent to which international variation, rather than convergence, is 
acceptable.
In this chapter, we focus on a diﬀerent aspect of suﬃciency— namely what 
price individuals can be asked to pay for an otherwise suﬃcient basket of benefits. 
1. Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal,” Ethics 98, no. 1 (1987): 21– 43.
2. Dean T. Jamison et al., “Global Health 2035: A World Converging Within a Generation,” 
Lancet 382, no. 9908 (2013): 1898– 1955; Carina Fourie, Chapter 1 in this volume.
3. Dimitra Panteli and Ewout van Ginneken, Chapter 13 in this volume.
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A well- designed minimum package is useless if accessing it entails exorbitant 
costs to potential beneficiaries.4 Out- of- pocket costs (OOPCs), such as user fees, 
point- of- service charges, copayments, or co- insurance, represent one category of 
such costs and are part of many health care systems. Policymakers are increas-
ingly interested in directing users to eﬀective services, which can involve raising 
OOPCs for less eﬀective interventions. Insurance premiums represent another 
type of cost to beneficiaries. To ensure aﬀordability, the use of an income- related 
cost ceiling— or sometimes several thresholds— that demarcates acceptable from 
unacceptable cost- sharing typically represents a cornerstone of any suﬃcientarian 
approach, regardless of how that approach is anchored in normative terms and 
even though approaches diﬀer regarding where exactly the threshold should be 
set. As such, health care costs pose two questions: What should be the threshold 
for the costs individuals are asked to bear? and What should be the relationship 
between costs and benefits (because benefits might be designed more generously 
if costs are higher, and, conversely, costs might be reduced if benefits are less 
comprehensive)?5
Broader movement toward universal health coverage (UHC) has recently 
brought the cost of health care into sharper focus.6 The World Health Organization 
(WHO) first formally endorsed UHC in 2005, calling on states to provide “access 
to [necessary] promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health interven-
tions for all at an aﬀordable cost.”7In 2015, the United Nations’ General Assembly 
adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) successors to the Millennium 
Development Goals SDG Goal 3 is concerned with health, and it includes as a 
target “universal health coverage … including financial risk protection, access to 
quality essential health care services, and access to safe, eﬀective, quality, and af-
fordable essential medicines and vaccines for all.”8
4. Institute of Medicine, Essential Health Benefits: Balancing Coverage and Cost (Washington, 
DC: National Academies Press, 2012), 12.
5. A third question is, of course, Who is to be covered? In principle, reducing (or not increas-
ing) the number of people eligible for health care can allow for more generous benefit pack-
ages and/ or lower OOPCs. Although the eligibility of noncitizens and others for health care 
is the topic of substantial debate, we bypass this issue in the following and make the sim-
plifying assumption that policymakers seek to enable access to the widest group of people.
6. Thomas O’Connell, Kumanan Rasanathan, and Mickey Chopra, “What Does Universal 
Health Coverage Mean?” Lancet 383, no. 9913 (2014): 277– 279.
7. World Health Organization, World Health Assembly 58, Resolution 33, Sustainable Health 
Financing, Universal Coverage and Social Health Insurance, http:// apps.who.int/ iris/ bit-
stream/ 10665/ 20383/ 1/ WHA58_ 33- en.pdf
8. Jamison et al., “Global Health 2035,” 1898– 1955.
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Both the 2005 and the 2014 characterizations of UHC refer explicitly to cost. 
However, the relationship between “financial risk protection,” which has become 
the primary yardstick for assessing the financial aspects of UHC, and thresholds 
for costs to individuals is complex. Levels of financial risk protection are typically 
measured using two indicators:  the incidence of so- called “catastrophic” health 
expenditures (where OOPCs exceed some percentage of household resources) and 
the incidence of impoverishment due to out- of- pocket health payments (where 
OOPCs push households below the poverty line).9 The health economists Adam 
Wagstaﬀ and Eddy van Doorslaer define catastrophic expenditures as those ex-
ceeding 40% of income after accounting for expenditures on food.10
Should eﬀorts to ensure that individual health care costs fall below a man-
ageable threshold focus on protecting individuals against the costs of expensive, 
one- time interventions? A report by the Lancet Commission on investing in health 
succinctly set out some of the principal problems with such an approach:
The most obvious administrative diﬃculty with the use of public funds 
for catastrophic coverage is that the definition of catastrophic for indi-
vidual patients depends on their income. Therefore, means testing at all 
income levels must be enforced or, more typically, catastrophic coverage 
is defined at such a high level that many expenses that are catastrophic 
for poor people remain uncovered. As the health economist Austin Frakt 
has argued, “almost any cost is catastrophic if you are poor.” A second dif-
ficulty is that the natural response of providers and patients will be to avoid 
less costly interventions in favour of more costly ones in order to receive 
coverage. Third, and most important, … evidence suggests that coverage 
of only high- cost procedures might be an ineﬃcient way to buy financial 
protection.11
Instead, the commission advocated an alternative approach termed “progressive 
universalism,” which can be realized in two subforms: by subsidizing interven-
tions frequently used by poor people, or by exempting poor people from insurance 
premiums and copayments.12
9. Jennifer Prah Ruger, “An Alternative Framework for Analyzing Financial Protection 
in Health,” PLoS Medicine 9, no. 8 (2012), accessed June 4, 2015, doi:10.1371/ journal.
pmed.1001294.
10. Adam Wagstaﬀ and Eddy van Doorslaer, “Catastrophe and Impoverishment in Paying 
for Health Care: With Applications to Vietnam 1993– 1998,” Health Economics 12, no. 11 
(2003): 921– 934.
11. Jamison et al., “Global Health 2035,” 1936.
12. Jamison et al., “Global Health 2035,” 1898– 1955.
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In this chapter, we illustrate how individual health care costs pose the issue 
of a fair threshold for medical costs by reviewing the introduction of essential 
health benefits (EHBs) as part of the Aﬀordable Care Act (ACA),13 the major health 
reform measure recently adopted in the United States. Among the questions 
debated as part of this reform were which services should be covered and what 
cost- sharing arrangements are appropriate. We argue that many health insurance 
plans, particularly those with significant copayments, may not protect individuals 
from health care costs that threaten their access to a decent minimum of care, and 
that individuals may be encouraged to purchase insurance at levels that are inad-
equate if they become ill, leading to insuﬃcient access to otherwise suﬃcient care. 
In particular, because financial burdens that impoverish people are incompatible 
with a minimally decent life, ensuring that people remain above a decent mini-
mum, however defined, after paying for health care is a desideratum for health 
system design, including cost- sharing.
2. Essential Health Benefits in the Affordable 
Care Act
Currently, as has been the case historically, the United States lacks uniform na-
tional standards for EHBs. In part, the absence of national standards reflects 
the complex mix of private and public providers through which health care is 
organized:
1. Private, employer- sponsored health insurance covers 48% of the population, 
with larger employers oﬀering their own programs and smaller ones purchas-
ing in groups from insurers.
2. Medicare (covering 16%) and Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance 
program (covering 14%) are financed by federal and state governments. These 
organizations provide services for people older than age 65 years, the least well- 
oﬀ, and individuals who meet special criteria, such as patients with end- stage 
renal disease.
3. Tricare provides services for active military personnel, and the Veterans Health 
Administration provides services for former servicemen and - women (3% are 
covered in this way).
4. Four percent of the population purchases insurance privately on the market.14
13. Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §18001 et seq.
14. Kenneth Finegold, New Census Estimates Show 3 Million More Americans Had Health 
Insurance Coverage in 2012 (ASPE Issue Brief) (Washington, DC: US Department of Health 
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Until recently, the United States had no universal medical coverage, and in 2010, 
when the Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act (ACA) was passed, approxi-
mately 60 million people completely lacked health insurance.15 ACA implemented 
an individual mandate that required people to either purchase insurance or incur 
a tax penalty.16 ACA also introduced insurance exchanges to enable purchasers to 
select policies from providers that have undergone quality screening and oﬀer a 
set of EHBs, which all providers participating in the exchanges (as well as outside 
of them) were required to cover from 2014 onward.
3. The Affordable Care Act’s Benefit Package
US legislators first addressed the question of what levels of benefits should be 
covered when Congress established Medicaid in 1965. Congress required that 
Medicaid participants have access to “medically necessary care,” but did not define 
what this meant.17 Although some private plans developed working definitions 
and the subject became the matter of lawsuits, it was not until the 2010 health 
reform that it was revisited on a broader scale.
ACA’s provisions regarding EHBs are relatively brief and apply to health plans 
sold in the individual and small- group markets, as well as to Medicaid coverage. 
They do not apply to self- insured health plans, those in the large- group market 
(typically companies with more than 100 employees), or grandfathered health 
plans (those in existence when ACA was passed). Section 1302 of ACA requires 
that plans provide services in at least 10 categories:  (1)  ambulatory patient ser-
vices; (2) emergency services; (3) hospitalization; (4) maternity and newborn care; 
(5) mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health 
treatment; (6) prescription drugs; (7) rehabilitative and habilitative services and 
devices; (8) laboratory services; (9) preventive and wellness services and chronic 
disease management; and (10) pediatric services, including oral and vision care. 
Within these categories, benefits must be equal to the scope of benefits covered 
in “a typical employer plan.”18 The content of EHBs became the subject of intense 
and Human Services, 2013); See also Thomas Rice et al., “United States of America: Health 
System Review,” Health Systems in Transition 15, no. 3 (2013): 1– 431.
15. Jacob Molyneux, “The Top Health Care News Story of 2010: Health Insurance Dominated 
the Year,” American Journal of Nursing 111, no. 1 (2011): 14– 15.
16. Elenora E. Connors and Lawrence O. Gostin, “Health Care Reform— A Historic Moment 
in US Social Policy,” JAMA 303, no. 24 (2010): 2521– 2522.
17. Daniel Callahan, “Medical Futility, Medical Necessity. The- Problem- Without- a- Name,” 
Hastings Center Report 21, no. 4 (1991): 30– 35.
18. Patient Protection and Aﬀordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §18002(b)(2)(A).
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lobbying from numerous interest groups, including patient groups, large employ-
ers, and health plans, during ACA’s passage through Congress and in subsequent 
stages.19
ACA required the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
to commission a report from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) that would recom-
mend a process for defining and updating EHBs. Addressing the definition of 
“typical employer,” the report noted diﬃculties in narrowing down the concept: If 
a “typical employer” should be representative of most employers, then the term 
refers to a small employer because 98% of all employer firms are classified as 
small. By contrast, if the term refers, then the “typical employer” is large, since 
large employers cover 65% of all employees.20 Reviewing the scope of benefits 
and premiums oﬀered by small and large employers, the report found them to be 
broadly similar. However, benefit design diﬀered frequently, with smaller employ-
ers more frequently having higher deductibles. Ultimately, the report suggested a 
focus on the health plans of small employers because most growth was expected 
in this sector.
The report considered two approaches to formulating a list of benefits. One 
strategy would specify a set of benefits first and consider cost later; another would 
establish a cost threshold first and then decide which benefits to include. IOM was 
unequivocal that the latter approach was superior. It proposed to take as a point 
of departure the national average premium (approximately $6,000) that small 
employers would have paid in 2014 for a mid- level single- person plan, had ACA 
not been enacted.
IOM’s recommended method for defining EHBs was pragmatic and process 
driven, and the institute did not set out a “shopping list” of “best buy” items. Its 
report focused on specifying criteria for determining the content of the aggregate 
EHB package and criteria for specific components (Table 14.1). It recommended 
starting with a typical small employer plan, developing a preliminary service list, 
and then applying the criteria to adjust the list as appropriate. Overall cost would 
be incorporated from the outset. It then proposed using public deliberation pro-
cesses and other public participatory processes to provide further guidance, before 
issuing final guidance on inclusions and permissible exclusions of services.
IOM’s proposal received a cold response. Its bold attempt to tackle rising 
health care costs by starting with a cost target smacked too much of unacceptable 
19. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Reinventing American Health Care: How the Aﬀordable Care Act Will 
Improve Our Terribly Complex, Blatantly Unjust, Outrageously Expensive, Grossly Ineﬃcient, 
Error Prone System (New York: PublicAﬀairs, 2014).
20. Institute of Medicine, Essential Health Benefits.
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rationing for both consumer and provider groups.21 Due to concerns about politi-
cal pressure, DHHS also did not go along with the key elements. Instead, in what 
has been described as “passing the buck,”22 DHHS announced that there would 
be no national set of benefits but that states individually would need to identify 
Table 14.1 Criteria for Determining EHBs
In the aggregate, the EHB package must
• Be aﬀordable for consumers, employers, and taxpayers.
• Maximize the number of people with insurance coverage.
• Protect the most vulnerable by addressing their needs.
• Encourage better care practices by promoting the right care to the right patient in 
the right setting at the right time.
• Advance stewardship of resources: maximize high- value services, minimize low- 
value services. Value is defined as outcomes relative to cost.
• Address the medical concerns of greatest importance to enrollees in EHB- related 
plans, as identified through a public deliberative process.
• Protect against the greatest financial risks due to catastrophic events or illnesses.
Specific components (individual services, devices, or drugs) must
• Be safe— expected benefits should be greater than expected harms.
• Be medically eﬀective, supported by a suﬃcient evidence base, or in the absence 
of evidence on eﬀectiveness, a credible standard of care is used.
• Demonstrate meaningful improvement over current services/ treatments.
• Be a medical service, not serving primarily a social or educational function.
• Be cost- eﬀective so that the health gain for individuals and the population is 
suﬃcient to justify the additional cost to taxpayers and consumers.
Caveats
• Failure to meet any of the criteria should result in exclusion/ significant limits on 
coverage.
• Each component is still subject to the aggregate EHB package criteria.
EHBs, essential health benefits.
Source: Adapted from IOM (2010); Institute of Medicine, Essential Health Benefits: Balancing 
Coverage and Cost (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2012), 55.
21. David Himmelstein, “Response to the Institute of Medicine’s Recommendation That 
Cost Determine Insurance Policies’ ‘Essential Benefits’,” International Journal of Health 
Services 42, no. 3 (2012): 571– 573.
22. Noam N. Levey, “Passing the Buck— Or Empowering States? Who Will Define Essential 
Health Benefits?” Health Aﬀairs (Millwood) 31, no. 4 (2012): 663– 666.
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EHBs, working from a benchmark plan. The benchmark could be (1) one of the 
three largest small- group plans in the state by enrollment, (2) one of the three larg-
est state employee health plans by enrollment, (3) one of the three largest federal 
employee health plans by enrollment, or (4) the largest health maintenance orga-
nization plan oﬀered in the state’s commercial market by enrollment.23
ACA gave IOM no space to propose a way forward regarding the financial 
impact on users, which was set out clearly in Section 1302 of ACA. Coverage was 
to be provided under four “metal” tiers. Plans in diﬀerent tiers do not diﬀer in 
content— all cover the same interventions— but they diﬀer in cost- sharing. ACA 
stipulates that a bronze- level health plan will cover 60% of health care costs, with 
40% to be met by the user. Plans cover 70% of health care costs in the silver level, 
80% in gold, and 90% in platinum, with users responsible for the respective re-
mainder. In addition, insurers may oﬀer a plan with lower actuarial value than 
that of the bronze plan to individuals under 30 years of age and to those who are 
otherwise exempt from the insurance mandate because available coverage is unaf-
fordable or enrolment would constitute a hardship. Insurers selling plans on the 
exchanges are not obliged to cover all four levels, but they must oﬀer one silver 
and one gold plan.
ACA also adopted several measures to reduce the financial impact on insured 
individuals. For all tiers, ACA caps the extent of cost- sharing achieved through 
OOPCs, requiring health plans to cover OOPCs that exceed the cap amount. In 
2014, the OOPC cap was approximately $6,000 for an individual and $12,000 
for a family. Where insurance is purchased through an exchange, people with 
incomes below 400% of the federal poverty level (FPL)— defined as $11,490 for a 
single- person household and $23,550 for a four- person household in 2014— can 
further reduce the OOPC cap to as low as approximately $2,000 (Table 14.2). All 
preventive care is exempt from OOPCs. In addition, ACA provided refundable tax 
credits to individuals below 400% of the FPL, which aimed to oﬀset the financial 
burdens of premiums on lower- income households by reducing their tax burden 
or even making their tax burden negative.24
For example, an individual with an income of $17,235 (150% of FPL in 
2014) would be expected to pay no more than 6.3% ($1,086) of her income per year 
for the second- lowest- cost silver plan. The remainder of the plan’s cost would be 
covered by tax credits. In addition, her OOPCs could not exceed $2,167 (the OOPC 
cap of $6,350 minus her two- thirds subsidy of $4,233). In the period of October 
1, 2013— March 1, 2014, 18% of those who selected a marketplace plan opted for 
23. Levy, “Passing the Buck— Or Empowering States?” 665.
24. For a useful overview of these credits, see Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, 
“Premium Tax Credits: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions,” accessed January 24, 2015, 
http:// www.cbpp.org/ sites/ default/ files/ atoms/ files/ QA- on- Premium- Credits.pdf.
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the bronze level, with 63% opting for silver, 11% for gold, and 6% for platinum. 25 
Eighty- three percent of those selecting a plan on an exchange chose one for which 
they received financial assistance; 93% of those selecting a silver plan are eligible 
for federal premium assistance.
ACA’s subsidy provisions function, although never explicitly, as protection 
against costs that exceed a threshold. The OOPC limits and premium subsidies 
serve to protect households against excessive medical costs incurred after they 
have purchased a plan that, at least in principle, secures access to suﬃcient medi-
cal care. In so doing, they reduce the number of households that fall below the 
poverty line as a result of seeking care.
4. Financial Thresholds and Health Care Costs
Health care costs— including insurance premiums and OOPCs— can worsen 
households’ financial positions. Ill health can have similar eﬀects, whereas good 
health can improve financial position. Although policymakers frequently set 
thresholds at levels diﬀerent from the theoretical literature, both policymakers 
and suﬃcientarian philosophers share a commitment to thresholds. Some policy 
Table 14.2 Premium Tax Credits and OOPC Subsidies for EHBs
Household Income 
(% FPL)a
Expected Contribution  
(% of Household Income)
OOPC Subsidies (Reduction 
of Maximum OOPC)
Up to 133 2 Two- thirds
133– 150 3– 4
150– 200 4– 6.3
200– 250 6.3– 8.05 One- half
250– 300 8.05– 9.5
300– 400 9.5 One- third
aFPL in 2014 was $11,490 for a single- person household and $23,550 for a four- person 
household.
EHBs, essential health benefits; FPL, federal poverty level; OOPC, out- of- pocket costs.
Source: US Department of Health and Human Services, Oﬃce of the Assistant Secretary 
for Planning and Evaluation, “2014 Poverty Guidelines,” accessed January 24, 2015. https:// 
aspe.hhs.gov/ poverty/ 14poverty.cfm.
25. US Department of Health and Human Services, “Health Insurance Marketplace: 
March Enrollment Report; For the Period:  October 1, 2013– March 1, 2014,” accessed 
January 24, 2015, https:// aspe.hhs.gov/ health/ reports/ 2014/ marketplaceenrollment/ 
mar2014/ ib_ 2014mar_ enrollment.pdf.
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proposals employ an absolute threshold of resources below which no individual 
should fall— for instance, the $1.25/ day global poverty line adopted by the World 
Bank. Others employ a societally relative threshold, such as the European Union’s 
definition of poor households as those falling below 60% of the median income 
in their society. Adopting a societally relative threshold means that a household 
whose income is above the threshold in a less- developed country might fall below 
the threshold if it emigrates to a wealthier nation. It also entails that any society 
with substantial inequality, no matter how high the median income, is likely to 
have members who fall below the threshold. Still others use a individually relative 
threshold: As economists Olivia Mitchell and Gary Fields state, “A standard of 
relative adequacy might be adopted where adequacy could be judged relative to 
one’s level of consumption prior to the event precipitating economic insecurity.”26 
Adopting this approach entails that two households in the same society could have 
the same income or same net worth but fall on diﬀerent sides of the threshold 
depending on their prior income.
We suggest that the individually relative threshold is least defensible. 
Although wealthier households may privately prefer to insure their current level 
of consumption, insuring such consumption is not a high- priority use of public 
funds. Nor is it morally appealing to ignore the plight of households experienc-
ing chronic medical costs that are small in individually relative terms but, over 
time, lead to growing disadvantage and social exclusion. In contrast, protecting 
households against the detrimental eﬀects of expenses that threaten to exclude 
them from participation in society is widely agreed, not only by suﬃcientarians 
but also by theorists ranging from egalitarians to classical liberals, to be a public 
priority.27 This provides support both for the societally relative threshold and for 
the absolute threshold.
Diﬀerent approaches to health care financing can aﬀect not only households’ 
physical health but also their financial health. An entirely publicly funded health 
care system that does not require individuals to devote income toward premiums 
or significant OOPCs, such as the UK’s National Health Service, will not drop 
households below a threshold because of excessive health care costs. However, if 
a publicly funded system can oﬀer only a limited package of benefits, households 
may fall below a threshold because of ill health that prevents work.
26. Gary S. Fields and Olivia S. Mitchell, “Reforming Social Security and Social Safety Net 
Programs in Developing Countries,” in Development Issues: Presentations to the 47th Meeting of 
the Development Committee, ed. P. Mountfield (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1993), 116.
27. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2001), 132; Matt Zwolinski, 
“Libertarianism and the Welfare State,” forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook 
of Libertarianism, eds. Jason Brennan, Bas van der Vossen, and David Schmidtz 
(forthcoming 2016).
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ACA’s approach to health care provision, particularly the cap on OOPCs and 
the subsidy for premiums, helps to limit health care costs. However, ACA’s caps 
and subsidies still allow some individuals to fall below a poverty threshold due to 
health care costs. Even reaching the cap of approximately $2,000 in OOPCs to 
which a family near the poverty line is exposed under ACA would almost certainly 
drop a household near the poverty line into poverty. The same is true, although to 
a lesser extent, for premium costs. Although households can be exempted from 
ACA’s requirement to purchase insurance and pay premiums if the payments 
would cause hardship or exceed 8% of income,28 exemption simply leaves a house-
hold uninsured, exposing it to potentially unlimited OOPCs. The same is true for 
the choice to make the fee payment for failing to purchase insurance.
By providing health care coverage without premiums and with limited OOPCs 
to households below 138% of the poverty line, ACA’s initially intended expansion 
of Medicaid would have substantially reduced the danger of households near the 
poverty line becoming impoverished by OOPCs and premiums. However, the 
Supreme Court made the Medicaid expansion voluntary, and nearly half of US 
states have refused to expand Medicaid for adults without dependent children, 
with many of these states providing Medicaid only to adults with dependents who 
fall substantially below the poverty line.29 Furthermore, even in those states that 
expanded Medicaid, households above the poverty line can be subjected to cost- 
sharing requirements up to 5% of yearly income, which means that households 
within Medicaid could still be impoverished by OOPCs.30
In addition, the design of the metal tiers, with the same coverage but diﬀerent 
levels of cost- sharing, when combined with the choice to design the subsidies to 
cover a silver plan, raises the risk that poorer households will be exposed to high 
OOPCs. Households can receive the OOPC subsidies only if they choose silver 
plans,31 and they receive tax credits toward premiums that are based on purchas-
ing a silver plan. A silver plan provides the exact same benefits as a platinum plan, 
but it has lower premiums and is actuarially predicted to involve higher OOPCs. 
28. US Department of Health and Human Services, “Exemptions from the Fee for Not 
Having Health Coverage,” accessed January 24, 2015, https:// www.healthcare.gov/ fees- 
exemptions/ exemptions- from- the- fee.
29. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Medicaid Income Eligibility Limits for Adults at Application, 
as of August 28, 2014 (Table),” accessed January 24, 2015, http:// kﬀ.org/ state- category/ 
medicaid- chip/ medicaidchip- eligibility- limits.
30. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Premiums and Cost- Sharing in 
Medicaid (Policy Brief) (Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013), 2.
31. Kaiser Family Foundation, Focus Health Reform: Patient Cost- Sharing Under the Aﬀordable 
Care Act (Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012).
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For many other goods, such as food, clothing, transportation, and housing, poorer 
households ensure that they preserve financial suﬃciency by making functional 
but less luxurious purchases. The uniformity of the metal tiers excludes the pos-
sibility of purchasing insurance that covers fewer interventions. Although there 
may be good arguments for not diﬀerentiating coverage by tier, related to concerns 
about adverse selection and about underinsured households imposing costs on 
hospitals and physicians, the choice not to subsidize cost- sharing for plans at the 
gold or platinum level seems to assume that poorer households should accept the 
silver plan’s comparatively higher level of cost- sharing. This is so even though 
poorer households are frequently less able to self- insure, making the purchase of 
gold or platinum insurance— which is actuarially predicted to cover a larger share 
of health care expenses— more rational for them.
Meanwhile, ACA provides subsidies even to households in little danger of 
falling below any morally significant threshold. OOPCs totaling $9,000 for a 
four- person household at 400% of poverty— one making more than $90,000 per 
year— would not drop that household below an absolute or a societally relative 
threshold. Indeed, even individually relative thresholds do not regard a house-
hold that incurs OOPCs amounting to 10% of income as in danger of financial 
insuﬃciency. Furthermore, preventing people from falling below a decent social 
minimum is a morally more urgent priority than providing subsidies that pro-
tect better- oﬀ households against income fluctuations. The US tax code does not 
permit taxpayers younger than age 65 to deduct OOPCs from their taxable income 
until the OOPCs exceed 10% of income.32 Although middle- class and wealthy 
households may well wish to insure themselves against such OOPCs, such insur-
ance is not a priority for public spending. Indeed, allowing households who can 
aﬀord higher OOPCs without risk of poverty to choose higher OOPCs might help 
to encourage greater cost awareness in the market for medical services.
5. Limiting Costs Within the Affordable Care 
Act’s Framework
How might ACA evolve to better promote the goal of keeping citizens above a 
threshold? Perhaps the most important evolution would be the broadening of 
access to Medicaid. The judicially imposed decision to give states discretion 
whether to expand Medicaid exposed many lower- income households to burden-
some OOPCs and premiums. If more states expand Medicaid access, households 
near the poverty line will be insured while being protected against potentially 
32. 26 U.S.C. § 213(a), (f).
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impoverishing OOPCs and insurance premiums. States can and should also 
choose to further reduce the OOPCs within the Medicaid program. Although 
nominal OOPCs may serve an important gatekeeping function, they should not 
expose households to poverty. To the extent that financial incentives to choose 
cost- eﬀective interventions are desirable, paying patients to choose those inter-
ventions, rather than imposing OOPCs, would prevent the risk of imposing ex-
cessive costs.33
Another evolution would be a shift in the OOPC subsidies. The current struc-
ture of the OOPC subsidies lacks a defensible foundation:  They leave poorer 
households exposed to impoverishment despite being insured while arguably 
being too generous to better- oﬀ households. They also contain sharp “cliﬀs”— 
the transitions between diﬀerent subsidies and out of the subsidy program— that 
are diﬃcult to justify. A better design for the OOPC subsidies would cover all 
but nominal OOPCs for individuals up to 138% of the poverty line— the Medicaid 
access cutoﬀ— and would phase OOPC subsidies out in a continuous, rather than 
stepwise, manner after that. Ending the subsidy before 400% of FPL could allow 
the increased coverage at lower incomes to be revenue- neutral. Another alterna-
tive to OOPC subsidies for wealthier households would be access to loans that 
enable them to spread the costs of one- time medical expenses over several years.
Extending OOPC subsidies to lower- income households receiving premium 
tax credits who choose to purchase gold or platinum plans instead of silver plans 
would also help to ensure financial suﬃciency. Purchasing a gold or platinum 
plan— despite these metals’ evocations of luxury— simply involves making larger 
prepayments for the exact same package of interventions in exchange for a re-
duced actuarial probability of high OOPCs. It does not make sense to deny house-
holds who choose to minimize their downside risk an OOPC subsidy, particularly 
because such a subsidy will likely be less costly given the reduced OOPCs in gold 
and platinum plans.
Moving from OOPCs to premiums, the increased premiums permitted under 
ACA for subgroups of the population (tobacco users, overweight individuals, 
and older people) should be designed so that they do not threaten financial suf-
ficiency.34 Premiums should be such that no household, regardless of medical risk 
factors, risks being impoverished by purchasing insurance. The exemption that 
permits individuals whose insurance would exceed 8% of income to go uninsured 
33. Harald Schmidt and Ezekiel J. Emanuel, “Lowering Medical Costs Through the Sharing 
of Savings by Physicians and Patients: Inclusive Shared Savings,” JAMA Internal Medicine 
174, no. 12 (2014): 2009– 2013.
34. Kristin Madison, Harald Schmidt, and Kevin G. Volpp, “Smoking, Obesity, Health 
Insurance, and Health Incentives in the Aﬀordable Care Act,” JAMA 310, no. 2 (2013): 143– 144.
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without paying a penalty represents another major gap that allows health care 
costs to threaten financial suﬃciency. It would be preferable to mandate that these 
individuals purchase a plan that protects them against health care costs that would 
leave them below a threshold while ensuring that they can access such a plan 
without impoverishment.
Finally, IOM’s suggestion that EHBs protect against financial risks should be 
reconceived. Rather than subsidizing access to one- time, high- cost interventions 
such as high- cost chemotherapy that would be prohibitively expensive without 
insurance, EHB design should put the highest priority on ensuring access to in-
terventions that help to sustain and improve households’ ability to maintain finan-
cial suﬃciency in the long term, particularly among lower- income households. 
ACA’s subsidies for preventive care are congruent with this goal, but curative in-
terventions can also help in achieving financial suﬃciency. For example, interven-
tions to help individuals quit smoking, overcome substance abuse, and deal with 
mental illnesses can ensure that earners stay in the workforce and continue earn-
ing income for their households. The same is true for interventions that address 
chronic childhood conditions such as learning disabilities and autism.
ACA represents an important step toward a health care system that ensures 
that every US citizen has access to a decent quantum of health care. However, 
whether it can do so while also ensuring that citizens receiving such care do not 
fall below a decent financial standard depends on how its financing structure 
evolves. A design that places greater emphasis on preventing impoverishment 
due to OOPCs and premiums, and that finances the achievement of that goal by 
reducing unnecessary subsidies to better- oﬀ households, would better accord with 
a suﬃcientarian approach to health care. Reducing impoverishment caused by 
ill health or lack of funds for health care helps to ensure that citizens can secure 
minimally decent lives.
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